

Project Real Peacework eAkademie – International Peace eSchool
Institute for individual Peace work & Future Design
Education for a basic understanding & working for peace & harmony in the world.
(In Cooperation with the Institute for Municipal sciences, Linz)
4020 Linz, Austria
eMail: real.peacework@gmail.com
Skype: [liverightrightnow](#)

www.realpeacework-akademie.info/linz
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www.omaep.com

to the
President of Ukraine
Petro Poroshenko
11, Bankova str.,
Kyiv–220, Ukraine, 01220

12, Shovkovychna str.,
Kyiv 01220

12 June 2014

How to (re)vivify the economy without credits, loans or means of investment? – a suggestion

Congratulation Mr President,

for being elected so overwhelmingly with almost 56% of the casted votes. This is a convincing result and shows the great support and trust you have. Your people belief that you are the right person at the right time able to solve the problems of the country and able to satisfy their desire for better living

In 2009 you stated that the governmental goal shall be conducting reforms, improving living standards and that you believe that here they must do everything to improve the situation in the country rather than to obtain somebody's permission for some actions do you remember?

I am sure those who gave you their vote had that in mind too: your promise.

And they are convinced that you are honest and sincere. You have the knowledge, the spirit and the strength to do what needs to be done. (April 2, 2014, "If I am elected, I will be honest and sell the Roshen Concern.")

You can count on the support of your people to go against habits and rules which needs to be abandoned and dropped (which are commonly introduced by institutions like IMF, World Bank, the EU) because otherwise an upturn in the economy is impossible and poverty becomes even more widespread.

Therefore:

- *Are you really willing to improve life and life-standard in your country?*
- *Are you willing to use **alternative solutions** to do so like **complementary currencies** to have a chance for change?*
- *Are you willing to accept help from people like me whose main goal is nothing else than helping people through information and knowledge about all that already available for years and decades to improve life, living, economy, the situation of the environment, crops and the quality of crops in agriculture, health and wellbeing wealth of the people? A society with more justice, freedom and democracy like in Switzerland which is one reason why this country is so rich and able to share its wealth with others*

Yes, it is so important to know so that people have a choice and become independent of others this si the way which leads to abundance and happiness in all spheres of life.

Dear Mr President,

Your country has everything needed for a restart and to become wealthy like Germany after the 2nd World War or after the end of the Weimar Republic. Are you aware of that?

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Education for a basic understanding & working for peace & harmony in the world.

- Do you ask yourself 'How to (re)vivify the economy without credits, loans or means of investment?
- How to help the companies in the cities, villages and the regions to stimulate the economy, to create jobs and full-employment?
- How to increase wealth and life-conditions of your people?
- And how to increase the income of tax?
- How to make it possible that the work becomes done, which is everywhere and waiting to be done?'

Well, Mr President,

The most challenging way possible for you to go is following the example of Toshiharu Kato, the Japanese Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry who is using **complementary currencies** to restructure and reorganizes the economy and to make the economy fit and stable in a world of crisis ... to bring wealth and abundance into the regions and to create jobs and income there.

Why complementary currencies?

Have a closer look on the attached information which includes links to Presentations and Interviews on YouTube as well as text.files to get a clear idea.

Dear Mr President,

Further information regarding all kinds of alternatives to whatever area in life desired you find there too as well as on our internet pages for a new society, where life and living is in harmony with the cosmic laws of life.

Good Luck Mr President

and if you need my help – or any other information – just send me an email and suggest a day / date to meet any time.

Sincerely yours.

Benjamin Christ

Real Peacework eAkademie

Department for solutions for a better world

p.s.: enclosed the letter in German to the ministry of finance (in 02.2009) with suggestions how to use the financial crisis to improve life standards in Austria and to strengthen the economy and the local markets. And as you remember Austria never had really a financial or economical crisis I think you may have translators for German in your team, in your office so that this letter is of any value for you. If not you have to limit yourself with the other pdf.file in English.

and remember that these scriptures are only the top of the iceberg which circulates right now everywhere in the world and especially also in the Ukraine?

Why? Simply because everyone in the world – and it doesn't matter in the East or the West – people are sick of becoming constantly limited or never getting the chance of being able to work for a better future. And why?

The monetary system needs to be changed. The answer?

Complementary currencies that's why we have already 1400 areas world wide and day by day new are implemented everywhere. Even the **Worldbank** acknowledges that only **complementary currencies** are able to satisfy the demand of a flourishing economy

Well, dear Mr President,

Give the people what they desire and need. They know about it!

WHY CANDIDATES WITH NO CHANCE
OF WINNING RUN IN THE ELECTION


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Déjà vu?

Ukraine risks returning to the post-Orange Revolution internal squabbles very soon

Despite hopes of another chance to completely reboot the country after the second revolution Ukraine is slowly entering the second round of squabbles within the once uniform Orange team. The leaders of the current presidential campaign are bringing back the groups of “Yulians” (after Yulia Tymoshenko) and “Victorians” (the former team of Viktor Yushchenko, now embodied in “Petrorians” after Petro Poroshenko), almost identical to those from the post-Orange Revolution years of

Author:
Oles
Oleksiyenko

2005-2009. When Viktor Yushchenko was President and Yulia Tymoshenko was Premier, they had waged a deadly struggle against each other instead of reforming and strengthening the country.

In the current campaign, the top three leaders have been unchanged for a while now. According to a survey by Rating, a sociological agency, held on April 25-30, Petro Poroshenko enjoys the support of 43.4% of those polled. Yulia Tymoshenko has 13.9%. Serhiy Tihipko, Anatoliy Hrytsenko

and Mykhailo Dobkin would get 6.7%, 4.5% and 4.3% respectively. However, when GFK Ukraine held a survey on May 6-8, it revealed a surprising result where Tymoshenko's rate was much lower and Tihipko's was much higher. As a result, it would be Serhiy Tihipko, not Yulia Tymoshenko, with the best chance to run against Petro Poroshenko in the second round.

Two important facts to know about GFK Ukraine's data are that the poll was held via telephone exclusively, and its predictions were always the farthest from the actual results compared to all other sociological services in Ukraine in previous elections. This is probably because GFK Ukraine does not cover the entire electorate in villages and small towns whose citizens account for nearly half of all voters in Ukraine. And Tihipko always had better rates in big and mid-sized cities, while Tymoshenko's core electorate was in rural regions.



PHOTO: PHIL

The names of the final pair in round two may change given the fact that only 37% of those polled claimed that they were “sure about their choice” in the latest survey by Rating. Another 33% said that they “were sure but their choice could still change”. Tymoshenko and Poroshenko have the most confident voters – 54% of their supporters were confident about their choice. 12% of those polled have not decided on their preferred candidate yet.

However, it is other figures that look worrisome. If Poroshenko and Tymoshenko get to the second round, only 14% of the Donbas citizens are prepared to vote for any of them. Two thirds insist that they will ignore the vote with these two candidates in the second round, essentially boycotting it. 22% are still contemplating their choice for the second round. No other region in Ukraine has such extreme sentiments. Only 35% will ignore the vote in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia Oblasts if these two candidates make it into round two, while 47% will not vote in Southern Ukraine. This could undermine the legitimacy of the election in Donetsk region and provide tools for speculations.

Despite the widespread Russian propagandist mantra about the government monopolized by Western Ukrainians, all top candidates come from Southeastern Ukraine. Petro Poroshenko was born in Odesa Oblast; Yulia Tymoshenko comes from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast;

Serhiy Tihipko used to live in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as well, and Mykhailo Dobkin comes from Kharkiv.

THE COMMON AND THE DIFFERENT IN THE PLATFORMS

The platforms of two top candidates in this campaign look attractive for the wide audience yet they do not fit in the scope of powers the current Constitution grants the President.

Yulia Tymoshenko openly claims her “will for power” and intentions to concentrate it in order “to break the current system”. Petro Poroshenko speaks of the opposite, pledging to “become a guarantor of the newly reinstated parliamentary system... while not

claiming powers that exceed the ones I am elected for”. Meanwhile, people who talk to him in person insist that his aspirations for absolute power are identical to, if not stronger than those of Tymoshenko.

Tymoshenko’s platform offers more populism that pops up in some mutually-exclusive promises. For instance, she pledges to extend moratorium on farmland sale while ensuring the opportunity to sell state-owned farmland at the market price (which cannot be estimated without the land market). She also offers an inflated annual lease price of 10% of the farmland market price (which, again, is impossible to calculate in a non-existent farmland market).

Another pledge in her platform is to abolish special pensions and privileges for all top officials. This is, however, forbidden to do for the pensioners who are already getting them. Tymoshenko is promising to ban fines for late utility payments “until welfare rises significantly”. This will result in arbitrary debts on utilities and gas, deteriorating utility services, increasing burden on the budgets of all levels, and, eventually, a situation where disciplined pensioners will keep paying for the wealthy judges delaying payments yet confident of their impunity.

Petro Poroshenko is trying to distance himself from social populism, a trademark element in his key rival’s campaign. He claims that “all political platforms you have seen before were about pennies from heaven but they never come down” and “clearly, I support


the rise of wages, pensions and student scholarships”, but “we will spend money on all this as soon as we have it once we have built a new economy”. Meanwhile, Poroshenko’s platform suggests that he expects to transfer responsibility for the social-economic situation in Ukraine on the government, the one in charge of “running economic processes” under the current version of the Constitution. As a guarantor of the Constitution, rights and freedoms, the President should only “create conditions” for social justice and innovative economy, Poroshenko believes.

If he indeed does not intend to expand his powers, he and his Administration will obviously act as expert observers who “evaluate and instruct” the government “responsible for running economic processes” and the parliament responsible for passing laws. When Yushchenko did that as President after the Orange Revolution, he faced harsh criticism from the Party of Regions, then in opposition, and from the majority of Ukrainian society that votes for the President and expects him to ensure full-scale transformations (voters don’t care how he does that), rather than to merely advise to the parliament and government which turn out to be the bad cops.

Thus, just like with Yushchenko, Ukrainian voters will soon inevitably see the President as someone responsible for the state policy. His attempts to criticize the government or the parliament for ineffectiveness will most likely fuel another round of deep disappointment: the voters will interpret this as just another series of internal squabbles in “the single democratic pro-European team”. This will discredit Poroshenko and Ukrainian statehood overall, thus playing into the hands of pro-Russian forces and the Kremlin’s policy to subordinate Ukraine.

COGNITIVE DISSONANCE

Both Tymoshenko and Poroshenko support lustration and elimination of corruption in the state bodies, fair courts, honest law enforcers, lower tax pressure on the business and demonopolization of the economy. Meanwhile, both groups are being staffed with representatives of the former govern-



ment. Poroshenko has been criticized multiple times for actively engaging people from the tandem of Serhiy Liovochkin, Party of Regions MP and ex-Chief of Staff under Viktor Yanukovich, and Dmytro Firtash, the gas tycoon recently arrested in Vienna on FBI warrant, in the regions. Tymoshenko's Batkivshchyna party voted in unison with the Party of Regions on acts that were not supported by the rest of the democratic coalition in the post-Maidan parliament. Svoboda members have blamed it for attempts to provoke their exit from the coalition so that the Party of Regions could replace them. As to oligarchs, Rinat Akhmetov seems to be the most interested one in Tymoshenko's presidency now, given his difficult record with Poroshenko in the past. So is Ihor Kolomoyskyi, the Dnipropetrovsk-based oligarch and owner of Privat Group, who is now actively gaining political weight under the rule of Tymoshenko's allies as interim government.

The most concerning aspect is obviously the Russian trace. Poroshenko is said to engage people related to Viktor Baloha and Volodymyr Lytvyn, Andriy Derkach and Dmytro Firtash. The latter two were always the key Russian lobbyists in Ukraine. Yulia Tymoshenko on her part has always been on good terms with the agents of Russian influence in Ukraine, such as Viktor Medvedchuk, his right-hand man Nestor Shufrych, Andriy Kliuyev (ex-Chief of Staff under Yanukovich), and Tymoshenko's one-time main advisor Andriy Portnov (ex-First Deputy Chief of Staff for Yanukovich). Acting President and Tymoshenko's ally Oleksandr Turchynov is known to have actively negotiated with Vadym Novynsky, Putin's "supervisor" in the Ukrainian parliament and business partner to tycoon Rinat Akhmetov. It is Tymoshenko's allies who were mostly blamed for the lack of adequate actions to restrain Russian aggression in Crimea and the Donbas in the first month after Yanukovich fled.

The recent deadly incident in Odesa adds to the Tymoshenko controversy: MP Oleksandr Dubovy, close to Tymoshenko and Turchynov, is said to have

been involved in covering up separatist groups and making sure that police chiefs avoided responsibility for helping or doing nothing to hold back separatists. Ex-governor of Odesa Oblast Volodymyr Nemyrovskiy and ex-Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko have both blamed him for lobbying the appointment of the traitor police chiefs, Dmytro Fuchidzhi and Oleh Lutsiuk. On the other hand, Poroshenko raises doubts as his plants resume operations in Russia and his business operates uninhibitedly in the Russian-occupied Crimea. Some refer this to his deals with Firtash whose efforts in lobbying Putin's interests became obvious from his clearly pro-Russian stance during the EuroMaidan.

TIED BY HESITATION

Both top candidates have similar approaches to the language issue, and these approaches will do nothing to consolidate the nation or overcome the regional divide. Yulia Tymoshenko promotes Ukrainian as the only state language with Russian and other languages having the official status in the regions where the dominating majority wants that. This will subsequently lead to increasing Russification of a number of regions in South-Eastern Ukraine (see p. 24). Petro Poroshenko pledges to preserve the current status quo on the language issue, which means that the Kolesnichenko-Kivalov language law will stay intact in its current version.

None of them is prepared to take steps to protect Ukrainian-speakers from Russification in Southern, Eastern and partly Central Ukraine, let alone facilitate the actual rather than formal use of Ukrainian as the state language. Eye-witnesses claim that both Tymoshenko, and Poroshenko, as well as their families, speak Russian at home and in private life while switching to Ukrainian in public or to talk to the people they find useful.

Both candidates promise to facilitate Ukraine's defence capacity and European integration. Yet, none mentions NATO membership in their platforms. Poroshenko, as the most likely winner of this campaign, seems only willing to follow the crowd on the

issue of NATO as the only way to guarantee Ukraine's security in the face of continuous Russian threat, and even accept the veto of the pro-Russian fifth column in Southeastern Ukraine. Apparently, he will be the first one to lead Ukraine to NATO as soon as 70% of Ukrainians support the idea. When the share is 30%, he will not since he would thus risk losing Donetsk or Luhansk Oblasts, Kharkiv or Odesa.

Instead, both candidates offer useless options to replace NATO membership. Tymoshenko suggests an amorphous "European policy of common security", while Poroshenko offers a reinforced version of the Budapest Memorandum. Both support elimination of any aspect in which Ukraine depends on Russia, energy being the top priority. Meanwhile, both support friendly, equal and partner



WHILE SUPPORTING LUSTRATION AND ELIMINATION OF CORRUPTION, BOTH TYMOSHENKO AND POROSHENKO ARE STAFFING THEIR TEAMS WITH PEOPLE FROM THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT

relations with the "future non-Putin democratic Russia" which is hardly an option at all.

Both Tymoshenko and Poroshenko pledge to abolish local state administration and to delegate most of their functions to executive committees of local councils. In the current situation, however, this can only further fuel separatism and restrict ways for the central government to affect inefficiency in the regions. If implemented, this will hardly liberate the central government from responsibility for local problems, as Poroshenko expects in his platform, since most Ukrainians remain paternalist-minded, especially in Southeastern Ukraine. They will keep blaming the chaos in their towns and villages on the incapable central government. That will allow local authorities to fuel such sentiments via their loyal local media, while Russia will use this to aggravate pro-Russian sentiments. ■

Right, Left or Centre?

In their words and deeds, Ukrainian parties alternate between being radical, conservative and liberal, depending on the circumstances and the electioneering situation. Yulia Tymoshenko's Batkivshchyna is one example

Author:
Ihor Losev

In contemporary Ukraine, discussions about political radicals, conservatives and liberals in Ukraine as counterparts of political groups in established Western systems appear to be quite scholastic, as in any unstructured emerging society. Roughly speaking, Ukrainian society is made up of oligarchs, bureaucrats, a thin stratum of entrepreneurs, the small and unstable middle class which has struggled to free itself from under the oligarchic-bureaucratic burden and a huge mass (primarily in Southeast Ukraine) of the dependent population that expects subsidies, donations and "bread and circuses" from any government.

As they compete for the electorate, parties are forced to keep these factors in mind. In their words and deeds, Ukrainian parties alternate between being radical, conservative and liberal, depending on the circumstances and the electioneering situation. Moreover, political parties in Ukraine have never been ideologically consistent. The main thing for them is to win votes, and if this requires a departure from their programmatic creed, so be it – to them, this is natural and necessary tactical flexibility.

In societies like Ukraine and some Eastern European countries, mass popular movements, such as Polish Solidarity or the People's Movement of Ukraine, are more efficient than parties. The People's Movement was a great force in the late 1980s and the early 1990s but

faded into insignificance after becoming a party.

However, such movements have to have a truly national, rather than narrow party-oriented, programme of fundamental social reforms that could unite millions of people who are divided on some other issues. (This is what causes the division of politically likeminded people into separate parties.) Then, acceptance of the key foundations of the movement becomes the criterion for leadership, even for non-members. The organization thus breaks away from the party quota principle which leads to mechanistic distribution of top offices among party members and puts party interests above national ones.

Meanwhile, we can see a liberal-radical-conservative mixture in the activities of most Ukrainian political parties. One case in point is Yulia Tymoshenko's Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) party. On economic issues, they are obvious liberals. In fact, it would be strange to see anything else from an organization in which business circles are represented so well. In the national and cultural sphere, Batkivshchyna seemed to be conservative, at least until recently when Tymoshenko decided to use the state language, Ukrainian, as a bargaining chip in southeast Ukraine. Her fiery anti-oligarchic rhetoric makes an impression that Fatherland is even radical.

The Svoboda (Freedom) party is liberal on economic issues (recognizing private property, the market and free competition), conservative on national and cultural issues and



radical in politics. It is hard to say anything definite about UDAR, except that it is a typical leader-centred party much as its allies in the coalition. The position of the leader here is more important than any programme.

The present circumstances demand energetic, precise and efficient actions rather than commonplace political PR, but Tymoshenko is a step behind in evaluating and reacting to events. Her actions are standard and more tailored to a peaceful time and evolutionary development. She is gathering some committees and setting up headquarters composed of retired generals and military men, promises to bring Crimea back to Ukraine and has travelled to the Donbas. However, all this activity does not involve any real steps that could affect the threatening developments in eastern Ukraine, even though she has the requisite leverage – not retired generals but her party members in the national government: Oleksandr Turchynov (her alter ego), Arseniy Yatseniuk, Arsen Avakov, Minister of Justice Pavlo Petrenko, etc. However, their actions have been such that, after Crimea was given up without a fired shot, the Czech defence minister said that the West would not be able to help Ukraine because it was passive in defending



PHOTO UNIAN

The performance of Tymoshenko's team in the government (formally, without her involvement) marks the downfall of Batkivshchyna, just like the downfall of the intrigue-based, behind-the-scenes, business-dominated brand of politics in Ukraine

chance in this election, does it mean that the country should be surrendered? Does it mean that Ukraine needs to have a weak head of state at this tragic hour? All for the sake of making Tymoshenko a strong prime minister in the parliamentary election – that is, if the country survives until autumn?

Acts of this kind committed during wartime smell of high treason. Ukraine, rather than Tymoshenko, should be on the leadership's minds. Instead of relishing her moment of glory, she may well become a political corpse – and not Tymoshenko alone but her entire party with all its members. Forever and irrevocably. They are now scrambling to draft a constitution of a de facto parliamentary republic (who needs a general presidential election then?) and want to scrap local state administrations, which would be an invaluable gift to the Kremlin and separatists.

The Ukrainian people, however, have acquired extensive political experience over these years – they see everything, which is a guarantee that there will be no prime minister from Batkivshchyna. Yatseniuk, who now holds the office, is increasingly acting like an extra minister of foreign affairs and Ukraine's unofficial ambassador to the IMF as he completely removes himself from, among other things, the anti-terrorist operation in Eastern Ukraine.

The performance of Tymoshenko's team in the government (for-

IN SOCIETIES LIKE UKRAINE AND SOME EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, MASS POPULAR MOVEMENTS, SUCH AS POLISH SOLIDARITY OR THE PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT OF UKRAINE, ARE MORE EFFICIENT THAN PARTIES

its own territory. Lithuania's defence minister explained to official Kyiv that preserving territorial integrity is Ukraine's right and duty. Tymoshenko's people in the government are constantly complaining of the bad army, unreliable police and questionable Security Service. However, Yuriy Lutsenko, ex-Interior Minister and counsellor to the acting president, says that Ukraine has enough well-trained special-task units, but they are not being used; there are a number of police units fully loyal to Ukraine, but they are not receiving adequate orders from Kyiv.

Ukrainian law enforcement officers are well aware of what has happened to their colleagues in the Crimea who switched their allegiance to Russia. They were first promised exorbitant salaries but later had to take tests which most of them failed. Former Security Service officers are now being given polygraph tests. Ukrainian military men who have betrayed their oath of allegiance are now told: "You will serve where the motherland will send you." This may be a place like Sakhalin, Wrangel Island, Altai or Kolyma, which means they will have to leave the sunny Crimea.

The situation with the power structures in Ukraine is alarming, but it is much better than the condi-

tion of the central government which is totally paralyzed either by fear or great responsibility. Winston Churchill once said: "Responsibility is the price politicians pay for power." If Tymoshenko believes that the catastrophically inadequate performance of her party will in no way affect her own political standing, she is being very naïve. She will be and is already being held responsible for all the party's failures. Her people surrendered the Crimea to Russia. The Ukrainian military held their ground there for nearly a month in extremely difficult circumstances, waiting for some sensible actions from Kyiv. They never came, and the military began to surrender.

Tymoshenko wasted the greatest chance of her entire life. If instead of ruling from behind the scenes without burdening herself with any formal obligations, she had chosen to be the prime minister and set about saving Ukraine with her characteristic zeal, she could become a national leader and this period would be her hour of triumph. However, she has gone the usual way of intrigue. The country is starting into an abyss, but Tymoshenko's friends concern themselves with ways of making the new president of Ukraine an absolutely powerless person and a largely ceremonial figure. If Tymoshenko stands no

mally, without her involvement) marks the downfall of Batkivshchyna, just like the downfall of the intrigue-based, behind-the-scenes, business-dominated brand of politics in Ukraine. Its first signs were seen in the Maidan in winter 2014 when the "leaders" showed they feared a wide popular movement and attempted to deny access to real power. Today, the country's leadership are acting contrary to the desire of the people to protect their country, hoping that the West will do more than Ukraine itself. ■

A Dangerous Compromise

If Ukraine's top officials are unable to adequately assess the fatal outcome of their efforts in compromise seeking with Russia for Ukraine, they have no right to head the country. If they do realize the danger of the linguistic concession they are about to make, they should be treated as actors in the Russian cultural and language expansion in Ukraine who intentionally undermine its constitutional order and national statehood

Author:
Volodymyr
Vasylenko

Russia's persistent yet ungrounded demands to make Russian the second state language in Ukraine continue to accompany its military aggression here. Moreover, Russian leadership has attempted to get Western countries involved in making Ukraine cede to these demands.

In negotiations with the US Secretary of State John Kerry in early March 2014, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov offered a plan to regulate the Ukraine-Russian conflict that would be ruinous for Ukraine's

unity and statehood if implemented. The demand to recognize Russian as the second state language in Ukraine was one of its points. Later, Lavrov's plan was outlined in the March 17 statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry proposing to set up an international "support group" to mediate in the crisis. Among other things, the statement said that "Russian will be granted the status of the second state language alongside Ukrainian while other languages will have the status envisaged by the European Convention for Regional Languages".

Western states refused to get involved in the anti-Ukrainian game imposed on them by Russia. Then, the leaders of Russian-instructed and armed separatist groups in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, echoed by their inspirers and ideological proponents from the ranks of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions, set about articulating Russia's demand.

Subsequently, Ukraine's leadership claimed ready to meet Russia's illegitimate demands halfway. In a joint statement from April 18, 2014, Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov and Pre-



mier Arseniy Yatseniuk announced that “oblast, city and county councils will be empowered to decide on granting an official status to Russian or other languages spoken by the majority in the given area alongside Ukrainian as the state language in order to accomplish peace and understanding”. “This statement was dictated by the agreement reached at the Geneva meeting between Ukraine, US, Europe and Russia,” Yatseniuk noted. When analyzed closely, however, the document entitled the Joint Geneva Statement on Ukraine from April 17, 2014, adopted by the parties to the Geneva meeting outlines only the initial steps to deescalate tensions, pointing only at the need to implement the constitutional process in Ukraine transparently, accountably, and based on a wide national dialogue that involves representatives of all regions and political forces and accounts for opinions and amendments offered by the community. The document does not hint at, or mention any concrete provisions of the future Constitution of Ukraine, including those concerning the status and the use of languages.

Why, then, do Ukraine’s leaders refer to the Geneva agreements to justify their approach to the language issue? Are they thus trying to make their stance look more

convincing, even if it is a strategic concession to Russia, runs counter to the Constitution and undermines Ukraine’s political unity and statehood?

Article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine defines Ukrainian as the only state language. No other languages have any state or official statuses in Ukraine under the Constitution or Ukrainian laws. The terms “official language” and “state language” are identical. It is for this reason that European constitutions use one of the terms, but never both in one law.

WHY MULTILINGUALISM IS NOT AN OPTION

The constitutions of Switzerland, Ireland or Malta have the term “national language” alongside their “official language” to refer to one or more languages of their indigenous titular nations. The Constitution and laws of Finland only have the term “national language” which can be interpreted as the official (state) language.

The constitutions of states like Serbia and Croatia have “the language of official use”. Constitutions of some other countries say that the language of the state is the language of the titular nation without qualifying it as official or state language. One example is Article 2 of the French Constitution: “The language of the Republic is French”.

Another is Article 3 of the Constitution of Turkey which defines Turkish as the language of the state.

Constitutions of some countries do not mention the status of their language. These include uni-

THE INTRODUCTION OF RUSSIAN AS THE STATE LANGUAGE WILL CAUSE THE DECLINE OF UKRAINIAN AND GRADUALLY OUST IT FROM ALL PUBLIC SPHERES

tary monarchies, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK, the latter having no written Constitution. The population in these countries is mostly comprised of one nation and the use of its language – Danish, Dutch, Norwegian, Swedish and English respectively as their official (state) language is a tradition that goes deep in history and is an obvious fact.

The authentic versions (English and French) of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities use the term “official language” to define the state language. Ruling No10-п/99 of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine dated December

SHOW-OFF PATRIOTS Most Ukrainian politicians see Ukrainian identity concept as something limited to exterior ethnographic symbols



PHOTO: VHAH



14, 1999, concerning the interpretation of Article 10 of the Ukrainian Constitution (The state language of Ukraine is Ukrainian – **Ed.**) also deems the “state” and “official” language as identical. Item 3 of the Ruling rationale says that “The state (official) language shall mean the language provided with the legal status of a mandatory means of communication in public spheres by the state”.

Thus, making Russian or other languages official ones as suggested by Ukraine’s Acting President Turchynov and Premier Yatseniuk will be equal in status to making them state languages. This runs counter to Article 10 of the Ukrainian Constitution. So does their intention to allow oblast, city and county councils decide on the status and use of languages locally, since under Article 92.4 of the Ukrainian Constitution it is the legislation exclusively that regulates that.

The stance of Ukrainian legislators obviously deviates from the practice of most European states whose Constitutions and laws entail the functioning of just one official (state) language in the state. Linguistic situations in countries with multiple official languages, such as Switzerland, Belgium and Finland where two or more state (official) languages are allowed, are completely different from the situation in Ukraine.

The Constitutional Court’s Ruling No10 stresses out that the provision on Ukrainian as the only state language in Ukraine is in Section 1 of the Constitution, the General Provisions. This section fixes the basics of the constitutional order in Ukraine. Therefore, the status of the Ukrainian language as the state language is an integral component of Ukraine’s constitutional order, and an important element in the organization of regulated state governance in all spheres of public life throughout Ukraine. Respectively, Article 156 of the Constitution defines a special procedure for amending Section 1 thereof to enhance protection of Ukraine’s constitutional order from opportunistic and arbitrary political decisions.

The status of Ukrainian as the official language is the key



Russia is demanding an official status for Russian in Ukraine to fragment it into linguistically separated regions and split the country apart in the future

framework component of the constitutional order of Ukraine as a European-type national state. Therefore, any attempts to implement other languages as official ones in Ukraine violate the Constitution, thus being an attempt on the constitutional order of Ukraine as an independent, self-sufficient, democratic national state.

UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE AND STATEHOOD

Unlike the languages of national minorities, Ukrainian is an element of state building. The use of it in all spheres throughout Ukraine is aimed at ensuring efficient operation of state institutions, control over mechanisms to guarantee national security, and political unity. The status of Ukrainian as the only state language does not deny the rights of national minorities to freely use any other language in social and private life. This is envisaged by

Russians or Russian-speakers in Ukraine face no discrimination for the language they speak whatsoever, so there are no grounds for granting Russian the official status here. In fact, it is the Ukrainian majority that faces linguistic discrimination in many regions of Ukraine (**see p. 24**). This discrimination manifests itself in the scarcity of Ukrainian-language schools and colleges, media, books or songs on the radio in places where they live.

The argument about the necessary official status for Russian in Ukraine in order to accomplish peace and understanding among its citizens does not hold up either. Despite the ongoing speculation on the language issue by the Russian “fifth column” and pro-Russian Ukrainian politicians, Ukraine has never witnessed any massive civil disorders or unrest on the language ground. Sociological surveys reveal that most Ukrainians are primarily concerned about personal safety, the poor quality of health care, and weak protection of their social, economic and environmental rights, not the status of the Russian language. The introduction of Russian as the official language and ruining of the country’s constitutional order cannot improve the quality of life in Eastern Ukraine.

The real goal of Russia’s claims for granting Russian and other languages the official status in Ukraine is to create a legitimate platform for total ousting of Ukrainian from use, not to protect linguistic rights of minorities. It aims at fragmenting Ukraine into linguistically separated regions

MINORITY LANGUAGES IN UKRAINE, JUST LIKE ANY OTHER COUNTRY, ARE NOT, CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT BE STATE-BUILDING ELEMENTS

Article 10.3 of the Constitution of Ukraine which requires the state to guarantee unrestricted development, use and protection of minority languages. However, minority languages in Ukraine, just like any other country, are not, cannot and should not be state-building elements, therefore they should not claim an official status in the country.

and splitting the country apart in the future.

Ireland's historical experience can serve as a warning to Ukraine to that end. At one point, Irish was the official language there, spoken by the entire population. Today, 1,656,790 out of 4mn Irish believe that they can speak Irish since they have studied it in schools. Only 380,000 are fluent in it, and just 20,000 of them list it as their mother tongue – they live in small northeastern parts of the country. This is the result of the radical political changes and tragic events of the 19th century in the Irish history, after it became part of the United Kingdom in 1801 and the Irish Potato Famine of 1846-1851, the disaster that killed 1mn Irish and forced another 2mn to flee the country. The domination of English as the official language in Ireland, coupled with the decline in the numbers of Irish-speakers, ousted their national language from the public sector as well as daily life in most parts of Ireland. After it regained independence in 1921, the Irish authorities have been taking efforts to support the Irish

language, yet the striking gap between English and Irish is growing, not shrinking every year. This was caused by the fact that, when the Irish national language and cultural space was destroyed, it passed the critical point after which the country found itself with continuing domination of English in public, daily and private lives. In this situation, even formal recognition of Irish as the first official language and English as second does not help. With two state languages throughout Ireland and English dominating there, Irish will face nothing but stagnation.

Ever since Russian was introduced as a state language in Belarus in 1996 alongside Belarusian, the range of spheres where Belarusian was used has shrunk abruptly, pushing it into decline and potentially complete vanishing from the European linguistic map.

Despite massive killings of Ukrainian-speakers in Holodomors (Famines), deportations and wars, and after lengthy Russification when Ukraine was part of the tsarist and Soviet empires,

The stance of Ukrainian legislators obviously deviates from the practice of most European states whose Constitutions and laws entail the functioning of just one official (state) language in the state

the language situation in Ukraine is still far better compared to Ireland or Belarus. However, the introduction of Russian as the state language will create the ground for the critical decline of Ukrainian to the level of Irish, leading inevitably to the gradual ousting of the language from all public spheres. Ukraine will subsequently turn into the Russified territory, easy prey for the constructors of the Russian World.

Therefore, any concessions to Russia on the status of Ukrainian as the only state language generate a threat to the existence of Ukraine as an independent national state and are unacceptable.

If Ukraine's top officials are unable to adequately assess the fatal outcome of their efforts in compromise seeking with Russia for Ukraine, they have no right to head the country. If they do realize the danger of the linguistic concession they are about to make, they should be treated as actors in the Russian cultural and language expansion in Ukraine who intentionally undermine its constitutional order and national statehood. ■



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